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THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION COURT OF JUSTICE’S 
AMAZON DECISION ON INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE 
COPYING AND AMERICA 
Jaclyn Kavendek+ 
“One good thing about music, when it hits you feel no pain.”1  This quote by 
late musician Bob Marley may ring true for music consumers, but the same may 
not be said for the artists creating musical works.  The authors2 and rightsholders 
who create, produce, and own the rights to musical works often feel economic 
pain resulting from the private consumption of their protected works without fair 
compensation.3 
As technology advances, so does the ease by which musical works can be 
reproduced.4  Rightsholders of musical works frequently remain uncompensated 
for technological reproductions of their protected works.5  The digital 
reproduction and sharing of musical works across borders requires international 
                                                            
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S., 
2012, George Mason University.  The author would like to thank her family for their constant love, 
encouragement, and support.  The author would also like to thank everyone at the Alliance of Artists 
and Recording Companies for sparking her interest in copyright and international law, especially 
Executive Director, Linda Bocchi, for her invaluable guidance. 
 1. BOB MARLEY AND THE WAILERS, Trenchtown Rock, on AFRICAN HERBSMAN (Trojan 
Records 1973). 
 2. “An author is ‘the party who actually creates the work, which is the person translat[ing] 
an idea into a fixed tangible expression.’”  Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 
(7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989)). 
 3. See, e.g., SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 F3.d 1220, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 382.11 (2010)) (explaining that, when setting royalty rates, the Copyright 
Royalty Board does not include: “(1) subscription to and the sale of advertising on channels that 
make only incidental use of sound recordings; (2) the sale or license of equipment; and  
(3) miscellaneous other sources”). 
 4. Congress added several provisions to the United States Code in 1992 to address a void in 
the copyright regime that was left open by the 1976 Copyright Act with respect to new, digital 
copying technologies.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(b), 1001–1010 (2012); Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, 
Constr. & Operation of Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001–1010, 178 A.L.R. 
Fed. 523, 528 (2002) (discussing Congress’s enactment of statutes in 1992 to prevent unauthorized 
digital reproductions of musical works); JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BRABEC, MUSIC, MONEY, AND 
SUCCESS, 354 (1994); Edward J. Damich, Our Copyright Code: Continue Patching or Start 
Rewriting?, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 361, 361–62 (2014) (elaborating on the newest technological 
advancements forcing the need to reform the United States Copyright Act). 
 5. See Recording Indus. Of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073–74 
(9th Cir. 1999).  There is also a need for a “progressive regulatory framework for copyright” in the 
European Union.  See EU Copyright Protection is Fundamental, INSIDE SATELLITE TV, Apr. 1, 
2014 (discussing the need for European Union copyright law to react to expanding technological 
advancements). 
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conformity and cooperation to protect and justly compensate rightsholders.6  
This cooperation is especially necessary for countries with thriving music 
industries, such as the United States and the countries in the European Union.7 
Dating back to the 1800s, Governments have recognized the need to ensure 
that original8 musical works are protected as an incentive for authors to continue 
to create more works.9  International treaties, such as the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”) and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization Performance and Phonograms Treaty 
(“WPPT”) have furthered governmental efforts to protect rightsholders by 
providing systems of equal treatment that internationalize copyright laws among 
the signatories of the treaties.10  This international effort to protect musical 
works has created a system that confers some uniform rights to rightsholders, 
including the exclusive right to reproduce their works.11  However, these 
international treaties also allow signatory countries to create some exceptions to 
the uniform rules.12 
                                                            
 6. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary & Artistic Works art. 1, Sept. 
9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (establishing “a union for the protection of the rights of authors in their 
literary and artistic works”); EU Copyright Protection is Fundamental, INSIDE SATELLITE TV (Apr. 
1, 2014) (calling attention to the need for uniform copyright laws throughout the European Union). 
 7. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 13 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/ 
38707619.pdf.  In the European Union alone, “[t]here are more than 250 collective management 
organizations” which represent rightsholders’ interests of one or more designated rights.  
Memorandum from the European Commission on Directive on Collective Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing—Frequently Asked Questions (Feb. 
4, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-79_en.htm. 
 8. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976); Directive 2001/29, art. 
12, 2001 O.J. (L167) 44 (EC).  The United States Constitution requires a work to be original to 
merit copyright protection.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991); 1 
SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW, § 4.11 (3d ed. 2013); BRABEC & BRABEC, supra note 4, at 350–51; 
DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS, 208 (1994).  
Originality, as applied by United States courts, requires independent creation and a trivial degree 
of creativity—a low standard to satisfy.  See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–47; Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (establishing that judges, when determining if a work 
is original, and thus protectable, should not consider aesthetics in their determination); Meshwerks, 
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
originality should be assessed by examining the final product, not the process used to create the 
product). 
 9. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50. 
 10. See Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 1–2; World Intellectual Property Organization 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty preamble, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 
(1997) [hereinafter WPPT]. 
 11. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 9; 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012); Directive 2001/29, 
supra note 8, art. 2. 
 12. See Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 9; WPPT, supra note 10, art. 16 (allowing 
signatory countries to create limited exceptions to copyright protections). 
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Many Berne Convention and WPPT signatory countries have enacted a 
private copying exception to the rightsholder’s exclusive right of reproduction.13  
A private copying exception allows individuals to store reproductions of musical 
works on devices with recording capabilities.14  Such reproductions do violate 
the rightsholders’ exclusive right of reproduction, but the rightsholders are 
compensated for the reproduction through private copying levy royalties.15  The 
private copying levy is placed on blank media devices and/or media that are used 
by consumers to make noncommercial copies for private use as a method of 
providing just compensation to rightsholders.16  Commonly, collecting societies 
represent the rightsholder’s interest in receiving royalties generated through the 
private copying levy.17  Collectives worldwide negotiate bilateral agreements to 
collect international private copying royalties for their respective rightsholder 
members.18  Bilateral agreements ensure that domestic rightsholders receive just 
compensation for the private copying of their protected works in other 
countries.19  However, such tax systems are not without fault.  The predominate 
problem the private copying levy system presents stems from the lack of 
congruency in the way private copying legislation is applied in different 
                                                            
 13. See Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, art. 5, MARTIN KRETSCHMER, INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
OFFICE, PRIVATE COPYING AND FAIR COMPENSATION 8–9 (2011), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_econ_ge_1_12/wipo_ip_econ_ge_1_12_ref
_kretschmer.pdf. 
 14. See KRETSCHMER, supra note 13, at 9–10 (discussing the legal basis of the private 
copying exception in Europe and the activities that constitute as private copying). 
 15. PASSMAN, supra note 8, at 248 (explaining that the 1976 Copyright Act’s legislative 
history clarified that recording works for private use in the home was not copyright infringement); 
see also KRETSCHMER, supra note 13, at 9–10. 
 16. See Case C-521/11, Amazon.com Int’l Sales, Inc. v. Austro-Mechana Gesellschaft zur 
Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte Gesellschaft mbH, CURIA, para. 5 (July 
11, 2013); Case C-462/09, Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH, 2011, 
E.C.R. I-5331, para. 8; Case C-467/08, Padawan SL v. Sociedad Gen. de Autores y Editores de 
España, 2010, E.C.R. I-10098, para. 2; PASSMAN, supra note 8, at 248 (listing the parties who 
receive the royalty payments from the levy); Shafer, supra note 4, at 528–29 (elaborating on the 
royalty disbursement process). 
 17. Jörg Reinbothe, Private Copying, Levies and DRMs Against the Background of the EU 
Copyright Framework, DRM LEVIES CONFERENCE (Sept. 8, 2003), http://ec.europa.eu 
/internal_market/copyright/documents/2003-speech-reinbothe_en.htm. 
 18. See, e.g., What Can AARC Do for Me?, ALLIANCE OF ARTISTS & RECORDING 
COMPANIES, http://wp.aarcroyalties.com/what-can-aarc-do-for-you/ (last visited, Mar. 28, 2014); 
About Croatian Performers’ Rights Collecting Society, HUZIP, http://en.huzip.hr/about-huzip (last 
visited, Mar. 28, 2014). 
 19. See KRETSCHMER, supra note 13, at 59–60 (explaining the costs involved in negotiating 
private copying royalty payments and the collective’s role in managing costs). 
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countries.20  Different laws complicate the remuneration, collection, and 
distribution processes.21 
Beyond participating in international treaties, the European Union passed 
Directive 2001/29 as an attempt to harmonize private copying remuneration 
collection and distribution practices throughout the European Union Member 
States (“Member States”).22  The European Union Court of Justice has clarified 
the vague, but mandatory guidelines of Directive 2001/29 and the ability for 
Member States to enact domestic private copying exception and levy.23  As part 
of this harmonization effort, the Court of Justice has ruled on three private 
copying cases within a three-year period.24  In these three cases, the Court of 
Justice supported and narrowed the existing European Union law allowing 
Member States to enact a private copying exception , but also requiring them to 
provide fair compensation to rightsholders for private copying and allowing 
them to charge a private copying levy to fund the compensation. .25 
In the earliest case, Padawan SL v. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores 
de España, the Court of Justice determined that all Member States that have 
adopted the private copying exception must follow the concept of fair 
compensation for rightsholders set forth in Directive 2001/29.26  The Padawan 
decision also created a loophole that allowed companies to circumvent private 
copying levies on blank media.27  The following year the Court of Justice built 
on its Padawan decision in Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies 
Deutschland GmbH.28  The Court held that each Member State, in accordance 
with the Padawan decision, may impose a private copying levy on importers and 
manufacturers where the private copying harm occurs.29 
                                                            
 20. See Lorraine Mallinder, Electronics Industry to Continue Subsidies of Artists, EUROPEAN 
VOICE (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/electronics-industry-to 
-continue-subsidies-of-artists/59286.aspx (noting that the private copying levy is not uniformly 
applied throughout the EU, which “impede[s] the functioning of the internal market”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at (1)–(6). 
 23. See Case C-521/11, Amazon.com Int’l Sales, Inc. v. Austro-Mechana, CURIA, (July 11, 
2013); Case C-462/09, Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH, 2011, E.C.R. 
I-5331; Case C-467/08, Padawan SL v. Sociedad Gen. de Autores y Editores de España, 2010, 
E.C.R. I-10098.  The Court of Justice examines European Union law, ensuring that it is consistently 
interpreted and applied by Member States.  Court of Justice of the European Union, EUROPEAN 
UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 
16, 2014). 
 24. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 67(1); Stichting de Thuiskopie, 2011, E.C.R. I-5331, 
para. 42(1); Padawan SL, 2010, E.C.R. I-10098, para. 64(1). 
 25. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 67(1); Stichting de Thuiskopie, 2011, E.C.R. I-5331, 
para. 42(1); Padawan SL, 2010, E.C.R. I-10098, para. 64(1). 
 26. Padawan SL, 2010, E.C.R. I-10098, para. 37. 
 27. Id. at para. 46. 
 28. Stichting de Thuiskopie, 2011, E.C.R. I-5331. 
 29. Id. at para. 29. 
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Most recently, in July 2013, the Court of Justice held in Amazon.com 
International Sales v. Austro-Mechana that a Member State may impose a 
private copying levy on all manufacturers and importers of blank media devices, 
even if a similar levy was charged in another territory, under the presumption 
that the devices will be used to reproduce protected works.30  The reproduction 
presumption can result in some manufacturers and importers getting taxed 
twice.31  However, double taxation is compatible with the fair compensation 
principle when joined with a reimbursement system.32  The Amazon decision 
closed the loophole created by Padawan by applying the private copying levy 
indiscriminately to recording devices regardless of their intended use, but gave 
manufacturers an option for reimbursement for exported devices on which the 
private copying levy had been paid prior to export.33  But the Amazon court also 
held that music collectives could allocate funds collected pursuant to the private 
copying levy to social and cultural projects.34  Thus, although the Amazon 
decision improved private copying practices by requiring the imposition of the 
levy in multiple Member States but allowing for reimbursement, the Court 
hindered just compensation goals by allowing collectives to allocate private 
copying monies to social and cultural funds.35  The collectives that allocate funds 
for social and cultural initiatives determine the percentage of money that gets 
distributed.36  Money that goes into social and cultural funds is money that is not 
directly compensating the rightsholders for the violation of their exclusive right 
of reproduction. 
This Note explores the potential negative implications the Amazon decision 
may have for rightsholders in the United States.  Part I begins by examining the 
rights conferred on rightsholders by the Berne Convention and WPPT.  It then 
explains the private copying practices in the United States and how they intersect 
with European practices and requirements.  Part I then explores the European 
Union’s recent efforts to harmonize private copying laws among the Member 
States.  Part II discusses the European Union Court of Justice’s Amazon decision.  
Part III analyzes the Amazon decision in light of the court’s previous decisions.  
This Note concludes by exploring the inequalities in musical collectives’ 
collection and distribution systems, confirmed by the Amazon decision, and its 
                                                            
 30. Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 45, 66 (holding that national private copying exceptions 
must satisfy “the effective recovery of the fair compensation for the harm suffered by the holders 
of the exclusive right of reproduction by reason of the reproduction of protected works by final 
users who reside on the territory of that State”). 
 31. See id. at paras. 33–36, 41. 
 32. See id. at 46–59. 
 33. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 37. 
 34. Id. at para. 55. 
 35. See id. (holding “that compensation cannot be excluded by reason of the fact that half the 
fund received by way of such compensation or levy is paid, not directly to those entitled to such 
compensation, but to social and cultural institutions set up for the benefit of those entitled”). 
 36. The Collective Management of Rights in Europe the Quest for Efficiency, KEA 
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, 79–80 (July 2006). 
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effect on American musical rightsholders.  Overall, this Note outlines the 
relevant history and legislation manipulating international private copying 
practices, and how the Amazon holding helps and hurts American rightsholders. 
I.  FORMING PRIVATE COPYING LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONGRUENCE 
A.  The Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention was drafted in September 1886 to establish the 
minimum standards of intellectual property protection signing countries must 
apply to literary and artistic works.37  The Berne Convention was necessary to 
protect authors and other producers of intellectual property.38  The Berne 
Convention established a union of Member Countries committed to protecting 
the rights of authors against infringement with respect to their intellectual 
property and artistic works.39 
Under Article 2, the Berne Convention extends protection to “every 
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, irrespective of 
expression or medium used to communicate such work.”40  The Berne 
Convention also specified criteria individual authors must meet to qualify for 
protection when publishing a literary or artistic work.41  Authorship protection 
under the Berne Convention depends on the author’s residence in a country that 
is a party to the treaty.42  An author can be granted protection without being a 
citizen or resident of a Berne Convention signatory only if the author first 
published the work in a signing country, or published it concurrently in a signing 
and a non-signing country.43  Perhaps most importantly, the Berne Convention 
                                                            
 37. See Berne Convention, supra note 6, preamble. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at art. 1.  As of January 15, 2014 there are 167 Berne Convention signing countries.  
Contracting Parties: Berne Convention, WIPO-Administered Treaties, http://www.wipo.int 
/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).  Signatory 
countries include countries with thriving musical industries, such as the United States, and countries 
with less musical popularity, like the Holy See.  See id.  For additional information on laws in the 
Holy See, see generally Stephen E. Young & Alison Shea, Separating State from Church: A 
Research Guide to the Law of the Vatican City State, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 589 (2007). 
 40. Id. at art. 2(1).  Article 2 also protects alternative works like translations, encyclopedias, 
and altered musical arrangements.  Id. at art. 2(3), (5).  However, certain works, such as news and 
other “miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information,” are not 
afforded protection under the Berne Convention.  Id. at art. 2(8).  A country’s governmental 
documents also fall outside the Berne Convention’s protection so that countries can make 
governmental documents readily available to citizens.  Id. at art. 2(4).  Finally, each country that 
signs the Berne Convention is allowed, through legislation, to list categories of works that are to 
not be protected unless fixed in a tangible medium.  Id. at art. 2(2). 
 41. Id. at art. 3. 
 42. Id. at art. 3(1)(a), (2). 
 43. Id. at art. 3(1)(b).  Publication can be done through a variety of mediums as long as the 
author consents to the publication.  Id. at art. 3(3).  Concurrent publication occurs when a work is 
published in a minimum of two countries within a thirty-day period.  Id. at art. 3(4). 
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extended the copyright protection of an author’s work across international 
borders by mandating that a work protected by one signing country receive the 
same protection in all other signing countries.44  This clause strengthened 
authors’ rights across borders.45 
Among the protections the Berne Convention conferred on authors was the 
exclusive right to reproduce their protected works.46  However, each signing 
country may create exceptions to the author’s exclusive ownership through 
legislation, so long as the exceptions do not excessively harm the author.47  The 
right of exclusive reproduction and the exceptions thereon applies to both sound 
and visual recordings.48  However, a musical work recorded for private use in 
one signing country may be duplicated in other signing countries without the 
author’s permission because signatories treat all citizens of all signing countries 
equally, and where there is a private copying exception, the signatories 
reciprocate fair compensation to the rightsholder regardless of residency.49  The 
fair compensation owed to rightsholders in a given signing country must be 
established by a “competent authority”50 to ensure equal remunerations to 
national and foreign rightsholders.51  To date, the Berne Convention has 
provided guidelines and served as an international roadmap for the protection of 
literary and artistic works. 
                                                            
 44. See id. art. 2(6).  Ultimately, this requirement imposed parity of protection for the 
nationals of all the countries that signed onto the Berne Convention.  Berne Convention, supra note 
6, art. 2(6).  The Berne Convention has been ratified by 167 countries.  See Contracting Parties 
Berne Convention, supra note 39.  All Member States of the European Union have signed or ratified 
the Berne Convention.  Compare id. with Countries, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/abouteu/ 
countries/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
 45. See Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 2(6). 
 46. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 9(1); Reinbothe, supra note 17 (describing the 
exclusive right of reproduction as “commonplace” because of the Berne Convention).  Many 
countries that have signed onto the Berne Convention have the same exclusive reproduction rights 
provision in their own laws.  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ 
INTELLECTUELLE art. 121–28 (Fr.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 2 (U.K.). 
 47. Berne Convention, supra note 6, art. 9(2).  Nationally enacted special conditions and 
restrictions on the musical author’s exclusive rights only apply in countries that have imposed 
similar conditions and restrictions.  Id. at art. 13(1). 
 48. Id. at art. 9(3). 
 49. See id. at 13(2).  However, if a musical work is protected by Article 13(1) and (2), and 
recordings of the protected work are “imported without permission from the parties concerned into 
a country where they are treated as infringing recordings,” the recordings will be subject to seizure.  
Id. at art. 13(3). 
 50. Id. at art. 13(1). 
 51. Id. 
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B.  The WPPT 
The WPPT is the most recent treaty on international practices concerning the 
rights of performers and producers.52  The WPPT confirms that rightsholders 
have the exclusive right of reproduction for their works.53  The treaty also 
requires each contracting party to confer equal protection among its own 
nationals and the nationals of the other WPPT signing countries.54  To ensure 
equal treatment, Articles 20 and 21 prevent the contracting parties from 
restricting any of the artists’ rights listed in the treaty.55 
However, the WPPT grants signatory countries the flexibility to implement 
exceptions to the protections afforded in the treaty.56  Each country can limit the 
rights of performers and producers of phonograms as long as the exceptions and 
limitations “do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the performance or 
phonogram and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
performer or of the producer of the phonogram.”57  Although the WPPT does 
not include an explicit private copying exception, some signatory countries, like 
the United States and some Member States of the European Union, have enacted 
private copying exceptions.58  Thus, creating a private copying exception to the 
exclusive right of reproduction is deemed to not conflict or prejudice the 
performers and producers of phonograms.59  Furthermore, because  
Article 15(3) of the WPPT requires signatory countries to apply their copyright 
laws uniformly to national and non-national rightsholders, exceptions like the 
private copying exception are even less likely to harm rightsholders because of 
the consistent application to all rightsholders.60 
                                                            
 52. The WPPT was enacted in 1996.  WPPT, supra note 10.  In 2002, the United States 
adopted the WPPT, followed by the European Union eight years later.  See Circular 38A: 
International Copyright Relations of the United States, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Jan. 2014), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38a.pdf; WPPT Notification No. 78, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (Dec. 2009), http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/wppt/treaty 
_wppt_78.html. 
 53. WPPT, supra note 10, at art. 7, (“Performers shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing 
the direct or indirect reproduction of their performances fixed in phonograms, in any manner or 
form.”).  A performance must be fixed to give the rightsholder the exclusive right of reproduction.  
See id. 
 54. Id. at art. 4(1). 
 55. Id. at art. 20–21. 
 56. WPPT, supra note 10, at art. 16. 
 57. Id. at art. 16(2). 
 58. See generally, WPPT, supra note 10; see infra note 77 (noting that the United States has 
a private copying exceptions and explaining its parameters). 
 59. WPPT, supra note 10, at art. 16. 
 60. See id. at art. 15(3). 
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C.  The United States Copyright Act 
The United States enacted its first copyright law in 1790 under the power 
granted to Congress by the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution.61  
Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”62  Congress gave the Library of 
Congress the power to administer copyright protection.63  The United States 
Copyright Office, as a separate department of the Library of Congress, monitors 
and reviews copyright requests as well as drafts new legislation.64  Copyright 
protection is used to promote authorship and progress65 with a secondary public 
policy purpose of advancing the social good.66 
Copyright law in the United States revolves around two central requirements.  
For a work to receive protection it must be original and fixed.67  Accordingly, 
the Copyright Act restricts mere ideas from receiving copyright protection.68  
                                                            
 61. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47, (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660.  
Although the United States has enacted its own copyright laws to govern intellectual property, the 
United States is also a contracting party to the Berne Convention and the WPPT.  134 Cong. Rec. 
D1375, 1377 (1986). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  Courts take a broad view of what constitutes a writing, and 
thus what can qualify for copyright protection.  See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 
U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (considering photographs as writings and thus afforded copyright protection). 
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (outlining the responsibilities of the Copyright Office as a branch 
of the Library of Congress); History of the Library, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://www.loc.gov/about/history-of-the-library/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (elaborating on the 
history of Library of Congress and copyright procedures). 
 64. A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copy 
right.gov.circs/circla.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2014); see also Damich, supra note 4, at 382–84 
(noting the functions of the Copyright Office and also explaining that, due to the powers it 
possesses, the Copyright Office functions more like an executive agency than a legislative branch 
entity). 
 65. See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 66. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (concluding that “[t]he economic philosophy 
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public  
welfare”). 
 67. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).  A work is fixed when the work is set “in a tangible 
medium of expression . . . in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is 
sufficiently permanent or stable.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  Although there is no requirement 
establishing how long a work must be embodied on a tangible medium for it qualify as “fixed,” 
digital works appearing on a screen for seconds are considered fixed, and thus copyrightable.  See 
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a copy of 
software is fixed and thus qualifies as a copy); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 
870, 874 (3rd Cir. 1982) (rejecting the argument that images appearing in an audiovisual game were 
not fixed because they were transient).  Fixation is also a WPPT requirement that United States 
copyright law must comply with as a contracting party to the WPPT.  See WPPT, supra note 10, at 
art. 7. 
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).  Section 102(b) established the idea-expression dichotomy which 
explicitly only extends protection to the expression of an idea, not the idea itself.  Id.; Feist Publ’ns. 
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Protectable works include literature, music, sound recordings, motion pictures, 
and architecture.69  Ownership70 of a copyright under United States law is 
initially vested with the author.71  Owners of musical copyrights have the 
exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies or phonorecords.72  The 
exclusive right of reproduction allows the rightsholder to sue for infringement.73 
1.  The Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”) and Royalty Payments 
The United States established an exception to the exclusive right of 
reproduction by passing AHRA.74  AHRA was enacted in 1992 and provides 
compensation to rightsholders in reaction to the consumers’ ability to make 
digital copies of legally obtained works for private use.75  The United States 
allows private copying only if the rightsholders of the protected works are 
compensated.76 
                                                            
Serv., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 
U.S. 99, 103 (1880)).  Under the idea-expression dichotomy, if there is only one way to express an 
idea, such method is not afforded copyright protection.  See Baker, 101 U.S. at 105 (holding that 
the defendant’s book explaining accounting methods did not give him the exclusive rights to make 
and use accounting books). 
 69. 17 U.S. C. § 102(a).  Copyright law draws a clear distinction between the protection of 
tangible works and the ideas and procedures to create the works.  See id. at § 102(b).  Copyright 
protection is not available to abstract notions and processes, on the product of the ideas.  Id. 
 70. Owners of musical copyrights have the exclusive right to publicly display, and manually 
or digitally perform the protected work.  Id. at § 106. 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).  United States copyright law allows authors to transfer 
ownership rights after they are initially conferred.  Id. § 201(d). 
 72. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).  Intent is irrelevant for infringement.  ABKCO Music, Inc. v. 
Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997–99 (1982) (explaining that even unconscious copying 
is still an infringement). 
 74. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified 
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012)). 
 75. The AHRA builds upon § 114(b) of the 1976 Act to compensate rightsholders for granting 
consumers the right to make digital copies of legally obtained works for private use.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001–1010; see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 649 (N.D. Ill. 2002) 
(quoting Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 
(9th Cir. 1999)); Shafer, supra note 4, at 523.  Digital recording devices allow for unlimited 
reproductions to be made from one recording, which enables “pirates” to distribute duplications of 
a protected work without obtaining proper licenses for the work.  Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 
F.3d at 1073. 
 76. See PASSMAN, supra note 8, at 248.  The AHRA provides that a consumer does not 
infringe on a copyright by making a noncommercial copy on a digital audio recording device.  17 
U.S.C. § 1008.  The United States recognizes and uses the private copying exception to balance the 
protection of authors’ rights against the social benefit created when works are publicly available.  
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984). 
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The AHRA prohibits manufacturing and importing “digital audio recording 
devices”77 unless proper notice is filed and applicable royalties are paid.78  
Digital audio recording devices must also conform to the Serial Copy 
Management Systems (“SCMS”).79  A SCMS digitally flags lawful copies of 
original works to prevent devices from making a copy of an existing copy.80 
Royalties are applied to the first manufacturers and importers of digital 
recording devices and media in the United States.81  Under the AHRA, copyright 
parties who are eligible to collect the levy include the owner of the exclusive 
right of reproduction, the legal or beneficial owner of the right to reproduce the 
musical work, the performer on the sound recording, or the organization 
representing any of the previously listed parties.82  The AHRA also outlines the 
royalty distribution procedure, conflict-resolution procedures, and the available 
remedies.83 
2.  Private Copying and the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has only indirectly addressed the issue of private copying.  
In evaluating private copying, the Supreme Court has noted that some authors 
                                                            
 77. The AHRA defines a “digital audio recording device” as a “machine or device of a type 
commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals . . . the digital recording function of 
which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making digital 
audio copied recording for private use.”  17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2012).  Professional devices and 
“dictation machines, answering machines, and other audio recording equipment that is designed 
and marketed primarily for the creation of sound recordings resulting from the fixation of 
nonmusical sounds” are not considered digital audio recording devices.  Id. § 1001(3)(A)–(B).  
According to the Senate Report on the AHRA, Congress intended the AHRA “to cover those object 
commonly understood to embody sound recordings and their underlying works.”  S. REP. No.  
102-294, at 36 (1992). 
 78. 17 U.S.C. § 1003(a). 
 79. Id. § 1002(a)(1); Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d at 1075. 
 80. See Kevin M. Dious, Note, Is Home Recording Dead?  A Discussion of the Atlantic v. 
XM Satellite Radio Litigation and Audio Home Recording Rights, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 269, 278 
(2007); Brendan M. Schulman, Note, The Song Heard ‘Round the World: The Copyright 
Implications of MP3s and the Future of Digital Music, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 589, 609–10 (1999). 
 81. 17 U.S.C. § 1004(a)(1).  Royalty payments are divided into two categories: the Sound 
Recording Fund and the Musical Works Fund.  Id. § 1006(b); BRABEC, supra note 4, at 354.  The 
AHRA divides digital devices into two categories: digital audio recording devices (“DARD”) and 
digital audio recording media (“DARM”).  17 U.S.C. §§ 1001(3)–(4).  DARDs are designed and 
marketed for personal use with the purpose of reproducing audio works for private use.  Id.  
§ 1001(3).  DARMs are also marketed to individuals, but are used to make reproductions of 
audiovisual works.  Id. § 1001(4). 
 82. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(7).  Individual interested copyright parties may opt to be represented in 
all procedural and litigation aspects of AHRA by collectives.  Severine Dusollier & Caroline Colin, 
Collective Management of Copyright: Solution or Sacrifice?: Peer-to-Peer File Sharing & 
Copyright, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 809, 817–18 (2011); see Reinbothe, supra note 17; What Can 
AARC Do For Me?, ALLIANCE OF ARTISTS & RECORDING COS., http://wp.aarcroyalties.com/what-
can-aarc-do-for-you/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (describing the mechanics of being represented 
by a collective). 
 83. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1009–1010. 
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have encouraged copying of their works for legitimate uses.84  The Supreme 
Court has also determined that, without more, equipment that merely has 
recording capabilities does not incur an automatic copyright infringement.85  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court has recognized the necessity of the private 
copying exception as a means of balancing the promotion of authorship against 
the social benefit that is created when works are made available to the public.86 
D.  European Union Directive 2001/29’s Vagueness Results in Incongruent 
Interpretations. 
Directive 2001/29 is an order issued by the European Commission to 
harmonize copyright laws and the treatment of protected works throughout the 
European Union by requiring all Member States to adapt their domestic laws to 
conform to the Directive’s terms.87  Directive 2001/29 not only stresses the 
importance of intellectual property as a whole,88 but also the necessity of 
promoting creativity and culture.89  To incentivize innovation in the arts, the 
authors of protected works in the European Union have the exclusive right of 
reproduction.90  However, Article 5 of Directive 2001/29 allows Member States 
                                                            
 84. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005).  But 
see Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 5–6,  
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480) 
(expressing displeasure with private copying).  In fact, the private copying levy can provide a source 
of income for rightsholders of musical works.  See PASSMAN, supra note 8, at 248–49.  But see id. 
at 250–51 (stating that many recording companies now include clauses in their contracts that 
provide recording companies with a claim to a portion of the musician’s AHRA royalties). 
 85. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“The 
sale of copying equipment . . . does not constitute contributory infringement if the product . . . is 
merely capable.”), superseded by statute, Digital Millennium copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 
112 Stat. 2860, as recognized in Real Networks Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 
913, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (noting that an 
intended use of a device does not bar its protection). 
 86. There cannot be copyright infringement when a noncommercial copy is made on a digital 
audio recording device by a consumer.  17 U.S.C. § 1008; Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 432. 
 87. See Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at para. 1.  Directives are mandatory regulations 
enacted by the European Union with the goal of harmonizing national laws of Member States.  
Member States must meet each Directive’s goal, but have liberty to choose the methods of 
implementation.  What are EU Directives?, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu 
/eu_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
 88. “Intellectual property has therefore been recognized as an integral part of property.”  
Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at art. 8. 
 89. Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at paras. 9–12.  The scope of coverage of Directive 
2001/29 includes all types of communications between the protected work’s author with the public 
through various mediums.  Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at para. 23. 
 90. See Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at art. 2 (granting the exclusive right of reproduction 
to authors, performers, and phonogram producers); see also Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at  
(2) –(3) (explaining the purpose of the Directive is to “stimulate the development” and to “foster 
substantial investment in creativity and innovation”). 
2014] The E.U. Court of Justice’s Amazon Decision  801 
to carve out exceptions to the authors’ exclusive rights by enacting national 
legislation.91 
Article 5(2)(b) explicitly allows a Member State to enact a private copying 
exception that allows for “reproductions on any medium made by a natural 
person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly 
commercial.”92  If a Member State enacts a private copying exception, it must 
include fair compensation for rightsholders.93  Directive 2001/29’s goal of 
harmonization has been unsuccessful thus far because the Directive gives 
insufficient guidance on how to apply the private copying exception and fails to 
define “fair compensation.”94  The ambiguous terms drafted by the legislature 
have left the interpretation of Directive 2001/29 in the hands of the Court of 
Justice. 
E.  The Padawan Manufacturers Loophole 
Without European Union legislative direction, Member States’ domestic 
legislatures and collectives are free to form their own interpretations of Directive 
2001/29.95  The lack of harmonization and certainty in the application of 
Directive 2001/29 quickly led to litigation for which the Member States’ 
respective courts submitted issues to the European Union Court of Justice for 
clarification.  In Padawan SL v. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de 
España, the Court of Justice was asked to interpret Directive 2001/29.96  
Padawan is a company that markets CDs, DVDs, MP3 players, and other 
recording devices, but refused to pay the private copying levy on recording 
devices it marketed in Spain, resulting in Sociedad General de Autores y 
Editores de España (“SGAE”) bringing suit to recover the unpaid levies.97  
SGAE is a Spanish society that collects and manages intellectual property rights 
on behalf of songwriters, composers, and music publishers.98 
                                                            
 91. See Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at art. 5(2)–(4).  Article 5 is permissible under the 
Berne Convention so long as an exception does not excessively harm the rightsholder.  Berne 
Convention, supra note 6, at art. 9(1). 
 92. Id. at art. 5(2)(b).  When enacting a private copying exception, Member States must take 
measures to ensure protection continues in the face of technological advances. Directive 2001/29, 
supra note 8, art. 6(1). 
 93. Id.; Reinbothe, supra note 17.  “As a mechanism for ‘fair compensation’, 22 out of 27 
European Union members have chosen to meet the requirement though a levy system.”  
KRETSCHMER, supra note 13, at 10. 
 94. See generally Directive 2001/29, supra note 8. 
 95. See Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at (7) (allowing for each Member State to keep in 
force their national laws that do not contradict or disrupt the express language and goals of 
European Union directives). 
 96. Case C-467/08, Padawan SL v. Sociedad Gen. de Autores y Editores de España, 2010, 
E.C.R. I-10098, para. 1. 
 97. Id. at paras. 16–17. 
 98. Id. 
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Padawan argued that “the application of that [private copying] levy to digital 
media, indiscriminately and regardless of the purpose for which they were 
intended (private use or other professional or commercial activities), was 
incompatible with Directive 2001/29.”99  Padawan also argued that 
indiscriminate application of the private copying levy to all digital media was 
inconsistent with Directive 2001/09.100  The Provincial Court of Barcelona 
referred five questions to the Court of Justice before it could make a ruling.101 
1.  Legislative Flexibility in Interpreting Fair Compensation . 
The first issue the Provincial Court of Barcelona asked the Court of Justice to 
clarify was whether Directive 2001/29’s goal of harmonizing fair compensation 
throughout the Member States takes priority over the Member States’ ability to 
enact unique collecting systems for private copying levies.102  The court declared 
that fair compensation “is an autonomous concept of European Union law which 
must be interpreted uniformly in all the Member States that have introduced a 
private copying exception, irrespective of the power conferred on them to 
determine . . . detailed arrangements for financing and collection, and the level 
of that fair compensation.”103  Therefore, under the Court of Justice’s ruling each 
Member State has the freedom to customize its own private copying levy system 
provided that it affords rightsholders fair compensation.104 
2.  Balancing the Harm Caused by Individual Users of Recording Devices 
with Fair Compensation 
Second, the Court of Justice considered whether under Directive 2001/29, a 
private copying compensation system adopted by a Member State, must balance 
the harm caused to rightsholders through private copying by providing fair 
compensation for the harm incurred and, if so, how to accomplish this.105  
Relying on Directive 2001/29’s preamble, the Court reasoned that the 
legislature’s intention was “to establish a specific compensation scheme 
triggered by the existence of harm to the detriment of the rightsholders, which 
gives rise, . . . to the obligation to ‘compensate’ them.”106  The Court held that a 
fair balance between compensation and allowing for private copying requires 
                                                            
 99. Id. at para. 17. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at para. 19. 
 102. Id. at para. 19(1) (asking whether fair compensation “entail[s] harmonisation, irrespective 
of the Member States’ right to choose the system of collection which they deem appropriate for the 
purposes of giving effect to the right to fair compensation of intellectual property rightholders 
affected by the adoption of the private copying exception or limitation”). 
 103. Id. at para. 37. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at para. 38.  A “fair balance” should weigh the harm caused to the rightsholders from 
the private copying exception against the compensation the rightsholders receives from the levy.  
Id. at para. 50. 
 106. Id. at para. 41. 
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that the rightsholders be compensated for the private copies made.107  
Furthermore, the Court established that individuals making private copies have 
undoubtedly caused harm to the rightsholders, and it is the private users who 
should remedy the harm caused to the rightsholders.108 
The Court realized the impracticability of identifying every individual guilty 
of causing harm to rightsholders.109  To achieve the goal of fair compensation 
for the harm done by private users, the levy is applied to recordable devices 
capable of making copies.110  This practice charges the private copying levy to 
those parties responsible for providing the equipment and media used to make 
and store a private copy.111  The Court concluded that the parties providing the 
equipment could be charged the levy costs in accordane with fair compensation 
under the presumption that the manufacturers and importers of such devices 
could easily pass the levy costs onto the individuals purchasing the digital 
reproduction devices to make private copies.112 
3.  Creating the Loophole: The Permissibility of Imposing the Levy on 
Digital Recording Implements as a Proxy for Individual Copiers and the 
Limitations Thereon 
After the Court held that Article 5(2)(b) ensures fair compensation, it 
addressed the Provincial Court of Barcelona’s third and fourth issues together.113  
The third issue addressed the validity of the common presumption that all 
recordable devices are used for making reproductions of protected works, and 
thus should be charged the private copying levy.114  The fourth issue was 
conditional upon the holding of the third issue, such that if the reproduction 
presumption was valid, would the presumption extend to obligate private 
copying levies on devices that are clearly marketed and widely used for 
professional copying.115  The Court upheld the reproduction presumption to be 
valid because there is “a necessary link between the application of the private 
copying levy to the digital reproduction equipment, devices and media and their 
use for private copying.”116  It does not need to be affirmatively proven that 
private copies were produced with the device.117  The devices’ recording 
capabilities justify being charged with the private copying levy.118 
                                                            
 107. Id. at paras. 39–42. 
 108. Id. at paras. 44–45. 
 109. Id. at para. 46. 
 110. Id. at paras. 46–50. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at para. 51. 
 114. Id. at para. 19(3). 
 115. Id. at para. 19(4). 
 116. Id. at para. 52. 
 117. Id. at paras. 54–56. 
 118. Id. 
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However, the Court also declared that indiscriminately applying the private 
copying levy to digital devices that are not used for private purposes is 
contradictory to the meaning of fair compensation in Directive 2001/29.119  
Undeniably, these holdings create a loophole for manufacturers and importers to 
argue that the levy should not apply because 1) the devices are not marketed or 
going to be used for private purposes; and 2) the devices will be exported and 
would be charged the levy when imported into another territory, and thus should 
not have to pay a similar private copying levy in the Member State where the 
device is manufactured.120  This loophole creates an ambiguity in the already 
incongruent interpretations of the private copying exception and levy 
applications by deferring to the manufacturers and importers, the parties 
responsible for paying the levy, the ability to ultimately determine the amount 
they will be charged. 
4. Applying the Court’s Holdings 
The Court did not answer the fifth question referred by the Spanish court 
because each Member State has the power to apply the Court of Justice’s 
holdings as it sees fit.121  While the Padawan decision began to refine private 
copying, it did not provide clear guidelines on how Directive 2001/29’s fair 
compensation requirement should be accomplished, and the decision created a 
problematic loophole for manufacturers and importers to evade levy payments.  
Private copying under Directive 2001/29 needed to be further interpreted to 
increase harmonization throughout the European Union. 
F.  Stichting122 and the Importance of Fair Compensation for Private Copying 
Only one year after deciding Padawan, the Court of Justice heard Stichting de 
Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH, et al.123  The Court used 
Padawan as support throughout its Stichting analysis.124  In Stichting, the 
European Union Court of Justice interpreted Article 5(2)(b) and (5) of Directive 
2001/29’s private copying exception.125  This case arose from a controversy 
involving the failure of Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH (“Opus”), a German 
                                                            
 119. Id. at paras. 53–54. 
 120. See id. at paras. 51–59. 
 121. Padawan SL, at paras. 61–63.  The final question was whether Spain’s indiscriminate 
application of its national private copying levy went against Directive 2001/29 “in so far as there 
is sufficient correlation between the fair compensation and the limitation of the private copying 
right justifying it, because to a large extent it is applied to different situations in which the limitation 
of right justifying the compensation does not exist?”  Id. at para. 19(5). 
 122. Stichting de Thuiskopie is Austria’s collecting society for private copying levies.  Case 
C-462/09, Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH, 2011, E.C.R. I-5331, 
para. 9. 
 123. Id. at para. 1. 
 124. See generally Case C-462/09, Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland 
GmbH, 2011, E.C.R. I-5331. 
 125. Id. at para. 1. 
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Internet-based company that heavily markets to consumers in the Netherlands, 
to pay the Netherlands’ private copying levy that is collected and managed by 
Stichting de Thuiskopie (“Stichting”).126  The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
stayed the proceedings until the European Union Court of Justice resolved two 
issues involving fair compensation under Directive 2001/29.127 
1.  The Responsibility for Payment of the Levy 
First, the Court of Justice addressed whether Article 5(2)(b) and (5) of 
Directive 2001/29 dictates which entity owes fair compensation to the 
rightsholders for privately copying protected works.128  The Court began its 
analysis by recognizing the vast discretion that is afforded to Member States 
through Directive 2001/29 in determining the responsible party for paying the 
private copying levy.129  In emphasizing the importance of fair compensation for 
rightsholders, the Court first ruled that the final user who actually creates a 
private copy is responsible for paying the private copying levy.130  This holding 
strengthens the Padawan decision by affirming that the individual who is 
responsible for violating the rightsholders’ exclusive right of reproduction has 
the obligation to fairly compensate the rightsholders.131  However, there is a 
caveat; Member States may charge the private copying levy to the manufacturers 
and importers of the recording equipment under the presumption that the levy’s 
cost will be passed along to the final user.132 
2.  Imposing the Levy on Importers and Manufactures 
Next, the Court addressed whether Directive 2001/29 dictates which party is 
responsible for paying “fair compensation” when recording devices are sold 
across Member States with different national private copying laws and levies.133  
Before answering the question, the Court made clear that one main objective of 
Directive 2001/29 was to ensure rightsholders were justly compensated.134  The 
Court declared that a Member State may charge private copying levies to 
manufacturers and importers of recording devices in the Member State where 
                                                            
 126. Id. at paras. 9–10, 12–14.  The Netherlands’ copyright laws impose the private copying 
levy on importers and manufactures of devices used for reproducing works, in accordance with 
Directive 2001/29 and Padawan.  See id. at paras. 7(1)–(3) (citing Law on Copyright, art. 16c(1)–
(3) (Auteurswet, Staatsblad 2008, No. 538)).  Opus sold and shipped recording devices to the 
Netherlands without paying the private copying levy.  See id. at para. 10. 
 127. Id. at para. 17. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at para. 23. 
 130. Id. at paras. 28–29. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. at para. 30. 
 134. See id. at para. 32 (stressing that without fair compensation the rightsholders would stop 
creating new intellectual works, and Directive 2001/29 was enacted, in part, to assure the continued 
“maintenance and development” of additional creative works). 
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the private copying harm occurs.135  Both of the Court’s holdings in Stichting, 
which are controlling throughout the European Union, narrow the broad 
language of Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 while strengthening the earlier 
Padawan decision.136 
II.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMAZON DECISION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Most recently, the Court of Justice further harmonized Article 5(2)(b) of 
Directive 2001/29 throughout the European Union in Amazon.com International 
Sales, Inc. v. Austro-Mechana .137  The Amazon matter was referred to the Court 
of Justice by the Austrian high court.138  The controversy before the Court arose 
because Amazon placed digital recording devices into the Austrian market by 
fulfilling orders placed by Austrian residents through its website.139  Austro-
Mechana,140 the society that collects the private copying levy for rightsholders, 
brought suit against Amazon in the Austrian courts to collect 1,856,275 € for 
payment of the private copying levies owed by Amazon from the first half of 
2004 and demanded Amazon’s records for the second half of 2004 to determine 
how much additional private copying levy funds Amazon owed.141  The lower 
Austrian court ruled in favor of Austro-Mechana, and Amazon appealed the 
decision to Austria’s highest court.142  The Austrian high court stayed the 
                                                            
 135. See id. at para. 41. 
 136. See id. at paras. 29, 41; Court of Justice: Presentation, CURIA, http://curia.europa 
.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/#competences (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (explaining that the European 
Union Court of Justice’s response to a reference for preliminary ruling, as was requested in 
Stichting, is binding on all Member State national courts). 
 137. See Case C-521/11, Amazon.com Int’l Sales, Inc. v. Austro-Mechana Gesellschaft zur 
Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte Gesellschaft mbH, CURIA, para. 1  
(July 11, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d5fd60 
d234a83f4364bf1fc6554ba55478.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4OaNmQe0?text=&docid=139407
&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=173684. 
 138. Id. at para 14–15 (noting that the Oberster Gerichtshof is the Austrian court of final resort).  
Both Stichting and Padawan were brought before the Court of Justice under similar circumstances.  
See Stichting de Thuiskopie, 2011 E.C.R. I-5399, at para. 17; Case C-467/08, Padawan SL v. 
Sociedad Gen. de Autores y Editores de España, 2010, E.C.R. I-10098, para. 19. 
 139. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 11.  Austrian law explicitly requires that 
remunerations be collected for rightsholders through a blank cassette levy, otherwise called a 
private copying levy, on recording devices that are suitable for reproducing protected works.  
Austrian Law on Copyright, Urheberrechtsgestz [UrhG] [FEDERAL LAW ON COPYRIGHT IN 
WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART AND ON RELATED RIGHTS] BUNDESGESETBLATT [BGBL] No. 
111/1936, ¶ 42b(1) (Austria). 
 140. Austro-Mechana is chartered under UrhG ¶ 42b(1).  See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 
9. 
 141. Id. at paras. 12–13.  Austro-Mechana’s original suit covered levies Amazon owed for 
recording implements sold from 2002 to 2004.  Id. at para. 12. 
 142. Id. at para. 14 (stating that the lower court ruled that Amazon must produce the financial 
documents requested by Austro-Mechana to determine how much money Amazon owed in levies 
for 2004). 
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proceeding and referred four issues to the European Union Court of Justice for 
clarification.143 
A.  Closing the Loophole: Indiscriminate Levy Applications Mandate a 
Reimbursement Option 
The first question the Court addressed was if devices are re-exported or not 
for private use, may the party who paid the private copying levy claim 
reimbursement from the Member State collecting society that indiscriminately 
applied a private copying levy regardless of the media’s intended use.144  This 
issue arose from the Padawan decision where the Court held that Member States 
could charge a private copying levy to recordable devices under the presumption 
that the devices were going to be used to make private copying.145  In 
determining whether importers and manufacturers have reimbursement claims, 
the Court looked to Padawan and Stichting to affirm that a Member State may 
enact a private copying exception as long as the exception is accompanied by 
fair compensation for the rightsholders.146  The Padawan Court outlawed the 
indiscriminate application of the private copying levy on devices not for private 
use.147  Furthermore, the Court also reaffirmed its analysis in Stichting that a 
Member State is allowed, but not required, to enact private copying levies, and 
because Directive 2001/29 does not explicitly say who is responsible for paying 
the private copying levy, the Member State has discretion to delegate payment 
responsibility.148 
As the Court previously held, the practice of charging the private copying levy 
to the manufacturers and importers of digital recording devices comports with 
fair compensation under the presumption that manufacturers and importers will 
pass the levy rates onto the consumer who actually causes the harm to 
rightsholders by making the unauthorized reproduction.149  In narrowing down 
                                                            
 143. Id. at para. 15 (outlining the four issues presented to the Court of Justice). 
 144. Id. at para. 16. 
 145. Case C-467/08, Padawan SL v. Sociedad Gen. de Autores y Editores de España, 2010, 
E.C.R. I-10098, paras. 52–54; see supra Part I.E.3 (explaining the Court’s reasons for validating 
the presumption that recordable devices were going to be used to produce private copies). 
 146. Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 19 (citing Padawan, at para. 30; Stichting de Thuiskopie 
v. Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH, 2011, E.C.R. I-05331, para. 22). 
 147. Padawan, at paras. 52–54. 
 148. Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 20, (citing Stichting de Thuiskopie, 2011 E.C.R. I-5349 
at para. 23).  It is established practice within the European Union to leave it to the discretion of 
decision makers in each Member State to determine the efficient and effective way of complying 
with a Directive if the Directive does not explicitly spell out criteria.  See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, 
at para. 21 (citing Case C-36/05, Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. Kingdom of Spain, 2006, 
E.C.R. I-10313, para. 33); see also Case C-245/00, Stichting ter Exploitatie van Naburige Reechten 
(SENA) v. Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS), 2003, E.C.R. I-1251, para. 34; Case C-433/02, 
Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. Kingdom of Belg., 2003, E.C.R. I-12191, para. 19. 
 149. Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 23–28; see also Stichting de Thuiskopie, 2011, E.C.R.  
I-05331 at paras. 26–28; Padawan SL, 2010, E.C.R. 10098 at paras. 45–46. 
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that process to the issue at hand, the Court stated that a private copying exception 
“must ensure . . . effective recovery of the fair compensation” paid through the 
private copying levy.150  The Court ultimately held that a Member State is not 
precluded from indiscriminately applying a private copying levy on commercial 
and private digital recording devices so long as a reimbursement process to 
recover the levy costs for the commercially used devices is available and not 
excessively difficult.151  This holding closed the loophole created by the 
Padawan decision by not allowing manufacturers to claim that devices will be 
exported and later levied or that the device is for commercial use.152  Even if 
devices are exported, and  the exporter pays the private copying levy twice (once 
in the Member State where the device was manufactured and once in the 
Member State where the device was imported) the manufacturer and importer 
can seek reimbursement from the first Member State because the actual harm 
will not be committed in the manufacturing Member State.153 
B.  Legal Responsibility for the Private Copying Levy Is Incurred When 
Devices Are First Placed in a Market 
The second issue the Court considered in Amazon was whether a Member 
State, under the meaning of fair compensation in Directive 2001/29, can charge 
the private copying levy to manufacturers and importers of digital recording 
devices.154  The Court  relied heavily on the Padawan decision, and the analysis 
involved answering the first issue in the case at hand.155  Manufacturers and 
importers are liable for the private copying levy even though manufacturers and 
importers do not directly cause the harm to the rightsholders; the cost of the levy 
is presumed to be passed on to the private user.156 
                                                            
 150. Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 32 (clarifying that “where such recovery presents 
difficulties, the Member State concerned is also required to resolve them by taking into account the 
circumstances of each case”). 
 151. Id. at para. 37.  Each Member State has the discretion to decide “whether the practical 
difficulties justify such a system of financing fair compensation and if so whether the right to 
reimbursement of any levies paid in cases other than that under Article 5(2)(b) of the Directive 
2001/29 is effective and does not make repayment of those levies excessively difficult.”  Id. at para. 
34. 
 152. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 153. Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 37. 
 154. The basis for answering the second question was established in Padawan.  As the 
Padawan court held, a Member State may validly presume that a device with recording capabilities 
will be used to make copies. Padawan SL, 2010, E.C.R. I-10098 at paras. 54–56.  The Padawan 
court concluded that it is only logical to require fair compensation as a “recompense for the harm 
suffered by the author,” and thus should be calculated so authors can recuperate from the harm the 
private copying exception expelled to them.  Id. at para. 40. 
 155. Amazon.com Int’l Sales at paras. 40–42 (affirming Padawan by reiterating that it is 
“sufficient to justify the application of the private copying levy” if a device with recording 
capabilities is marketed to the general population). 
 156. Id. at para. 48. The Court stated that: 
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This presumption is “justified and reflects the ‘fair balance’ to be struck 
between the interests of the holders of the exclusive right of reproduction and 
those users of the protected subject-matter.”157  However, the presumption can 
be rebutted when a recordable device is not marketed to private persons and the 
final usage of the device is not for private copying, thus putting the device 
outside the scope of the private copying exception and levy.158  When the 
presumption is successfully rebutted, the rebutting party is entitled to 
reimbursement as defined in the holding for the first question.159  Ultimately, 
Amazon court held that Member States are allowed under Article 5(2)(b) of 
Directive 2001/29 to charge the private copying levy to manufactures and 
importers who first place a recording device in a Member State’s market under 
the presumption that the device will be used to reproduce copies of protected 
works.160 
C.  Collectives’ Rightful Allocation of Private Copying Levies to Cultural and 
Social Funds 
The Amazon court next considered whether collectives representing 
rightsholders of musical works may assign a percentage of private copying funds 
to cultural and social programs for the indirect benefit of their rightsholder 
members, instead of paying the funds directly to the rightsholders themselves.161  
As previously discussed, collectives in Member States are responsible for 
collecting and distributing the funds received from the private copying levies to 
the rightsholders.162  Historically, collectives have been able to use a percentage 
of the private copying funds received towards social and cultural projects.163  
                                                            
Activity of the persons liable to finance the fair compensation namely the making 
available to private users of reproduction equipment, . . . is the factual precondition for 
natural persons to obtain private copies.  Second, nothing prevents those liable to pay the 
compensation from passing on the private copying levy in the price charged . . . Thus, 
the burden of the levy will ultimately be born by the private user who pays that price.  In 
those circumstances, the private user . . . must be regarded in fact as the person indirectly 
liable to pay fair compensation. 
Id. 
 157. Id. at para. 43. 
 158. Id. at paras. 44–45.  The Court recognizes the challenges involved in identifying the final 
use of the device, which validates the presumption.  Id. at para. 45. 
 159. Id. at paras. 37, 45. 
 160. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 45. 
 161. Id. at para. 46. 
 162. See supra note 7.  Austro-Mechana is responsible for distributing the funds received from 
the private copying levy to the rightsholders.  Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 9.  Austro-Mechana 
puts fifty percent of the private copying funds received towards social and cultural projects.  About 
Us, AUSTRO-MECHANA, http://aume.at/show_content2.php?s2id=1. 
 163. Such allocation has never been overruled or limited.  See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 
46–55 (discussing the permissibility of a collective’s ability to allocate fifty percent of the private 
copying funds towards social and cultural programs). Collective management organizations, 
despite using funds to indirectly benefit the rightsholders, are long-believed to ultimately cut 
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The Amazon court upheld this practice reasoning that it is within Member States’ 
and collectives’ discretion to provide part of the fair compensation owed to 
rightsholders in the form of indirect compensation.164  However, the Court 
emphasized that the social and cultural projects must actually benefit the 
rightsholders and cannot be discriminatory.165  Ultimately, there is no legal 
reason barring indirect compensation through social and cultural projects, thus 
allowing collectives like Austro-Mechana to allocate a percentage of private 
copying levy funds to programs that indirectly benefit the rightsholders. 
D.  Private Copying Levies Can Be Applied in a Member State to a Device that 
Has Already Been Charged a Similar Levy in Another Member State 
The Court next considered whether paying a private copying levy in one 
Member State on a device prohibits another Member State from charging a 
similar private copying levy on that same device simply because the device 
crossed borders.166  To begin the analysis, the Court reiterated that it is the 
responsibility of the Member State, if it enacted a private copying exception, to 
ensure the fair compensation of rightsholders for the harm done to them by the 
final user making the reproduction.167  The Court found that since the fair 
compensation obligation cannot be evaded, it does not make a difference if the 
sale occurs in another country or if the device was previously charged a private 
copying levy.168  Therefore, the Court affirmed its holding in Stichting that 
Member States that have enacted private copying exceptions must ensure fair 
compensation for rightsholders for the harm caused by the private reproduction 
of protected works.169  The harm occurs in the Member State where the private 
consumer uses the device, and that Member State is responsible for financing 
fair compensation to the rightsholders.170  Not allowing the Member State where 
the device is imported and where the final users reside to charge a private 
copying levy would go against the Member State’s obligation to fairly 
compensate rightsholders.171 
The Court then extended its holding that a similar private copying levy already 
assessed in a Member State does not preclude another Member State from 
                                                            
procedural costs when enforcing protection of copyrighted works.  See Severine Dusollier & 
Caroline Colin, Collective Management of Copyright: Solution or Sacrifice?: Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing & Copyright, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 809, 817–18 (2011). 
 164. Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 49. 
 165. The Court defers to the Member States to judge discriminatory acts done by collectives.  
However, the Court expressly states that barring rightsholders from other countries from benefiting 
from the social and cultural programs is a discriminatory act.  Id. at paras. 53–54. 
 166. Amazon.com Int’l Sale, at para. 56. 
 167. See id. at paras. 57, 59, 64. 
 168. See id.  
 169. Id. at para. 57 (citing Case C-462/09, Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies 
Deutschland GmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-5349, at para. 34). 
 170. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 58–59. 
 171. See id. at paras. 58–61, 64–66. 
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assessing its national private copying levy on the same device.172  The Court 
reasoned that although the private copying levy can be charged to the same 
device twice, “a person who has previously paid that levy in a Member State 
which does not have territorial competence may request its repayment in 
accordance with its national law.”173  The Court supported the mandated 
reimbursement option, which addresses the fact that a recording device can be 
charged a private copying levy in multiple Member States because fair 
compensation is needed for the private reproduction of protected works, not for 
the transferring of a device across international borders.174 
III.  AMAZON’S PRIVATE COPYING HOLDINGS SIMULTANEOUSLY PROVIDE 
MORE PROTECTION BUT LESS DIRECT FUNDS FOR RIGHTSHOLDERS 
Directive 2001/29’s ambiguous language and failure to establish a uniform 
private copying exception for Member States has led to inconsistent private 
copying laws throughout the Member States.175  The vague “fair balance” 
guideline fits with the European Union’s goal of allowing Member States 
flexibility in interpreting European Union-made law, but with such flexibility 
comes a lack of congruency.176  The string of cases the European Union Court 
of Justice has decided on private copying within three years exemplify the 
importance the European Union is putting on establishing uniform private 
copying practices throughout the Member States.177 
The Amazon case strengthened private copying levy systems in the European 
Union by allowing devices to be assessed the private copying levy twice so long 
as there is a reimbursement option for manufacturers and importers.178  This 
double-payment option benefits international rightsholders by closing the 
loophole the Court of Justice created in Padawan, which allowed manufacturers 
to claim the device was going to be charged the private copying levy when it 
was imported into another Member State and thus would be immune from being 
charged the levy in the Member State in which the device was manufactured.179  
The Amazon Court also positively expanded the scope of the private copying 
exception by allowing a Member State to presume that a blank media device 
                                                            
 172. Id. at para. 64. 
 173. Id. at paras. 65–66. 
 174. Id. at paras. 62, 66. 
 175. See supra Part I.D (explaining that under Directive 2001/29 each Member State is 
permitted to enact its own private copying law). 
 176. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining the purposes of Directives in 
harmonizing European Union law). 
 177. See generally Case C-521/11, Amazon.com Int’l Sales; Case C-462/09, Stichting de 
Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH, 2011, E.C.R. I-05331; Case C-467/08, Padawan 
SL v. Sociedad Gen. de Autores y Editores de España, 2010, E.C.R. I-10055. 
 178. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 64–65. 
 179. See id. 
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would be used for private reproduction purposes.180  At the same time, the 
Amazon decision hurts international rightsholders by failing to eliminate or even 
limit the percentage of private copying levy money that collectives may allocate 
to social and cultural funds.181 
A.  Positive Results of the Reimbursement Option 
The Amazon court held that fair compensation allows the private copying levy 
to be charged twice while also granting the payer a right of reimbursement for 
the first levy payment.182  The reimbursement option balances protection of all 
parties involved in the private copying levy system.183  The reimbursement 
option prevents manufacturers from claiming that they do not have to pay the 
private copying levy because the device will be exported.184  The Amazon 
decision affords rightsholders more protection and compensation by preventing 
manufacturers from exploiting the Padawan loophole.  The reimbursement 
option is added to give the manufacturers and importers of blank media devices 
the ability to sell products across borders without fear of paying twice and does 
not allow manufacturers, who are also exporters, to avoid paying the private 
copying levy in the Member State where manufacturing takes place.185  
International companies will be able to cut loses by seeking reimbursement of 
double-charged private copying levies.186  This will ensure that the money 
received from private copying in a given Member State is an accurate account 
of the importing and manufacturing of digital recording devices within the 
Member State. 
B.  International Relations Among Collectives Representing Rightsholders of 
Musical Works 
Collectives form bilateral contracts with other collectives to protect their 
rightsholder members internationally.187  Yet, foreign collectives typically 
                                                            
 180. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 28, 41, 45. 
 181. Id. at para. 55 (holding that half of the funds may be paid to social and cultural institutions 
but failing to establish a percentage that would violate the notion of fair compensation). 
 182. Id. at paras. 64–65. 
 183. See id. 
 184. This practice was the result of the Padawan decision.  See Padawan SL v. Sociedad Gen. 
de Autores y Editores de España, 2010, E.C.R. I-10055, paras. 51–59. 
 185. Although the manufacturer or importer would technically pay the private copying levy 
twice, the reimbursement process may not be excessively difficult.  Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 
37. 
 186. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 64–65 (allowing for repayment for those who have 
been charged double). 
 187. Memorandum from the European Commission on Directive on Collective Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing—Frequently Asked Questions 4 
(Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-79_en.htm. 
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reserve funds for “social and cultural establishments.”188  In the majority of 
Member States, the collective determines the distribution processes, including 
the percentage that is allocated to social and cultural programs.189  As the 
Amazon court explained, allowing collectives to allocate levy funds to social and 
cultural organizations comports with Directive 2001/29’s goal of enhancing 
creativity.190  Although such social and cultural programs benefit the artist and 
music communities generally, they do not directly compensate the rightsholders 
for the exploitation of their protected works.191 
International music collectives, like Austro-Mechana in the Amazon case, 
allocate percentages of the money received from private copying levies to social 
and cultural funds.192  The Amazon decision affirmed Austro-Mechana’s ability 
to take fifty percent of the private copying levy money for social and cultural 
funds.193  The practice of allocating a percentage of the private copying money 
decreases the amount of money paid directly to the rightsholders.194 
The collective allocates money to the social and cultural fund before directly 
distributing the levy proceeds to the rightsholders.195  The majority of programs 
paid for by the money allocated to the social and cultural fund are held in the 
respective country, and for a rightsholder to be able to even indirectly benefit 
from such programs, the rightsholder would need to be present in the respective 
                                                            
 188. See, e.g., Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 46.  In Austria, artists have established an “Art 
is Right” movement to raise awareness of intellectual property rights.  Home, AUSTRO-MECHANA, 
http://aume.at (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
 189. The Collective Management of Rights in Europe the Quest for Efficiency, KEA 
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 68 (July 2006) (detailing the governing structure of collectives in the European 
Union). 
 190. Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at para. 52 (citing Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, at paras.  
10–11). 
 191. See Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 49–50, 53. 
 192. See, e.g., The Social and Cultural Institutions of the Austro-Mechana,  
AUSTRO-MECHANA, http://aume.at/show_content2.php?s2id=83 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) 
(noting that Austro-Mechana allocates fifty percent of private copy levy funds to cultural 
institutions). 
 193. Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 46–55. 
 194. Id.  For additional information on the recent movement to regulate collectives in the 
European Union, see Memorandum from the European Commission on Directive on Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing—Frequently Asked 
Questions (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-79_en.htm. 
 195. See Memorandum from the European Commission on Directive on Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing—Frequently Asked 
Questions, 8–9 (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14 
-79_en.htm (discussing the need for transparency in collectives’ royalty deduction processes and 
the need for collectives to be able to substantiate all activities involving royalty accounts, including 
deductions used to fund social and cultural programs); see also The Collective Management of 
Rights in Europe the Quest for Efficiency, KEA EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, 79–80 (July 2006) (providing 
examples of social and cultural programs Member States fund through private copying levy 
monies). 
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country.  These social and cultural programs are a way for the collective to 
benefit its national members more so than non-national rightsholders.196 
Each collective in a bilateral agreement can, and often does, allocate a 
different percentage for social and cultural funds.197  For example, the United 
States does not deduct royalties for social funds.198  The disparity in countries’ 
collectives’ practices harm the rightsholders who cannot even indirectly benefit 
from the social and cultural activities offered in the withholding country because 
the money for the social and cultural funds gets deducted prior to distributing 
funds directly to rightsholders.199  This method of indirect compensation for 
rightsholders is not beneficial to all rightsholders, especially American 
rightsholders.  The Court of Justice could have ended this gross inequality by 
outlawing deductions for social and cultural activities, or at least limited the 
percentage of royalties that collectives are allowed to allocate to such unfair 
social and cultural funds.200 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Amazon decision successfully clarified four issues surrounding Article 5 
of Directive 2001/29 and eliminated the Padawan loophole.  However, until a 
uniform unambiguous law is in place, the inconsistencies in private copying laws 
and the bias practices of collectives throughout the European Union will persist.  
The Amazon decision not only affects the rightsholders of musical copyrights in 
Member States, but also affects American rightsholders.  As long as collectives 
around the world continue to deduct rightsholders’ royalties for social and 
cultural funds, American rightsholders will be denied true fair compensation. 
 
                                                            
 196. Memorandum from the European Commission on Directive on Collective Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing—Frequently Asked Questions 
(Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-79_en.htm. (proposing 
increasing collective regulations). 
 197. See, e.g., The Social & Cultural Institutions of the Austro-Mechana, supra note 192. 
 198. See Alliance of Artists & Recording Comps., supra note 85. 
 199. See Memorandum from the European Commission on Directive on Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing—Frequently Asked 
Questions, 8–9 (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14 
-79_en.htm (discussing a proposed memorandum to regulate collectives, including the amounts a 
collective is allowed to deduct from the funds collected). 
 200. But see Amazon.com Int’l Sales, at paras. 46, 55 (reaching an alternative conclusion). 
